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NEW DATA ON POLITICAL EXPENDITURES, 
ACTIVITY, AND SUCCESS 
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This paper utilizes new data to evaluate the determinants of thc 
political influence of thirty-five manufacturing industries on the U .S .  
Congress during 1976-80. Several tneasures of itifluence serve to distill- 
guish between political activity and success. Seller concentration and 
geopolitical dispersion increase both activity and succe.ss, but neither 
industry size nor leading-firm size proves significant. We test whether 
political expenditures facilitate obtaining the favors conferred on an i n -  
dustry by its market structure or by influence independent of that strur- 
ture; statistical inference strongly confirms both roles. 
Economists who pursue the consequences of market organization have now 
reached beyond the narrowly economic to the social and political realms. Downs 
(1957) and later writers have supplied an inventory of attractive economic models of 
political behavior which have yielded testable hypotheses about the effects of market 
and enterprise structures on political influence. Unfortunately, these empirical tests 
all suffer several serious deficiencies. In this study we use new data to avoid or miti- 
gate these deficiencies. These data reflect the activity directed toward the U.S. Con- 
gress by 35 manufacturing industries over the period 1976-80, and the degree of 
political success that they attained. 
I. PROBLEMS WITH STATISTICALTESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
ABOUT POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
Our contribution lies more in data and testing procedures than in new primary 
hypotheses; thus we start by reviewing the principal defects of previous statistical 
tests. Each reveals some or all of the following shortcomings: 
1. The study addresses the factors determining only a single outcome of political 
influence, such as the rate of tariff protection granted to an industry or its average 
realized rate of corporation income tax, Yet political influence used for one purpose 
may well be unavailable for another. We expect that the economic actor uses his 
assets to gather the most valuable basket of plums from the political tree. A powerful 
industry might use its influence to gain large benefits of one type, passing up lesser 
ones that it could have seized instead. Any test of the relation between overall politi- 
cal influence and the number of plums plucked from a particular branch therefore 
utilizes an incomplete model. 
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2. Some studies investigate the relation between a sector’s market structure and 
its expenditures on influencing the political process. Others address the relation 
between market structure and political outcomes. But none of them closes the circuit 
of relationships by investigating the role of expenditures in wielding political influ- 
ence, despite the urging by some writers that the relationship may exhibit significant 
scale economies or threshold effects. 
3. Each study implicitly assumes a locus of political decision that may besharply 
at variance with the institutional evidence on where, when, and by whom these 
decisions get made. Tariffs in year t are regressed on market structures prevailing at 
that time, even though many or all of the rates last received active political consider- 
ation years before. Similarly, industries’ effective rates of corporation income tax are 
explained by their market structures, despite the fact that those tax rates result from 
broader political decisions that affect many other industries and administrative 
rulings that apply to individual firms. Although the assumption of a perfect market 
in political coalitions averts the need to establish a direct correspondence between 
economic actors and the political actions taken, this assumption is empirically 
implausible. 
A brief outline will serve both to preview our own analysis and to indicate how 
we evade these traps. We observe the bills introduced in the U.S. Congress during 
1976-80 which we deem to affect the specific interests of 35 manufacturing indus- 
tries. We also secure information from the industries’ lobbying organizations on 
their legislative priorities during these years and how many goals they achieved. 
These measures of political outcome reveal the whole spectrum of political favors 
sought by these industries from the U.S. Congress, if not from the U.S. Government 
as a whole. We thus analyze the spectrum of political outcomes and not a single class 
of them, dealing substantially with the first problem noted above. We also confine 
the inquiry to a specific locus of political choice and period of time (the third prob- 
lem). We secure data on some classes of expenditure related to political influence, 
allowing a partial investigation of how political benefits depend on expenditures 
(the second problem). 
II. ATTRIBUTES, EXPENDITURES AND POLITICAL BENEFITS 
Most of the hypotheses to be tested below are derived from the existing economic 
models of political behavior. We note their origins in the course of presenting the 
explanatory variables that they indicate. However, one conceptual problem which 
requires advance consideration concerns the effects of an industry’s expenditures on 
political influence on the benefits it receives. Theoretical models of political influ- 
ence emphasize the industry’s structural attributes as the basis of its influence. For 
example, in a pure voting model (Downs, 1957), an industry commands the most 
influence if its economic welfare has the potential to determine the electoral choices 
of the most voters. Given the attributes that endow a sector with political influence, 
what significance do we ascribe to the resources it spends directly on political influ- 
ence? Two answers are possible which hold quite different implications for the statis- 
tical relation between market structure and political influence. 
Independent role of expenditures. With the political effect of the industry’s 
structural attributes taken into account, expenditures may wield an independent 
influence on the political benefits attained. This view implies that a million dollars 
efficiently spent should buy the same value of political benefits, no matter what 
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industry does the spending. The independent role of expenditures invites us to as- 
sume that the industry is a unitary actor making rational investments in political 
benefits. Given the benefits conferred by its dowry of structural attributes, it spends 
to support political candidates, disseminate information favoring its cause, etc., up 
to the point where the last dollar buys just one additional dollar of expected benefits. 
That the political benefits gained per dollar of an industry’s expenditures are inde- 
pendent of its structural attributes is a limiting assumption, but one that offers two 
testable predictions. First, political expenditures and structural attributes should 
both contribute to the statistical explanation of the political benefits that industries 
secure. In addition, differences in political expenditures among industries should 
not be just a direct reflection of differences in the structural bases for their political 
power. 
Facilitating role of expenditures. At the opposite pole, political expenditures may 
represent a transaction cost that an industry incurs to convert its attributes into 
effective influence. If political benefits are foregone when no funds are spent, trans- 
action outlays will yield very high net benefits up to the point where they accomplish 
their purpose, beyond which the marginal net benefits drop abruptly. Some types of 
political expenditure seem likely to play a facilitating role: listening-post activities to 
determine what policy issues might affect an industry’s interest, the dissemination of 
information to Congress and the public about an industry’s problems or the worthi- 
ness of its requests, etc. A “facilitation” model of industries’ political expenditures 
yields the prediction, opposite to that of the preceding “independent” model, that 
industries’ expenditures should be largely explained by their structural attributes. 
Expenditures should add little to the ability to explain political benefits on the basis 
of structural variables. These conflicting predictions will be tested in the following 
regression analysis. 
These two models of the role of expenditures raise another point about the deter- 
mining roles of attributes and expenditures. Many political decisions are adversary 
in that benefits conferred on one sector come largely at the expense of another, or 
that the benefits of a positive-sum game captured by one sector become unavailable 
to another. The political-science literature suggests a variety of distinctions resting 
on the extent and character of adversary relations surrounding political decisions. 
The adversary structure of many political decisions holds two implications for the 
inter-industry analysis of political benefits. First, where political allocations are a 
zero-sum game among industrial sectors, the standard procedure of treating indus- 
tries (and their attributes) as independent observations becomes inappropriate. The 
extent of adversary economic interest between pairs of sectors and the relative values 
of the attributes determining their political power then needs to be modeled. Sec- 
ond, rational investments of resources in political influence depend on conjectures 
about the probability of winning in adversary situations. If each actor’s political 
power were accurately defined and known to all, contests of will would generally 
not occur; losers would capitulate in advance, and winners would spend only the 
minimal transaction costs needed to claim their trophies. We can hardly conceive 
that an industry’s political benefits bear a continuous relation to its structural attrib- 
utes or political expenditures without assuming that the actors face either a shifting 
set of unfamiliar adversaries or great uncertainty about the chances of defeating an 
opponent with known assets. We shall embrace the assumption in the following 
analysis, but we do  build into our regression analysis one check to help test its valid- 
ity. We employ a portfolio of dependent variables that give varying weights to the 
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number of political contests that an industry entered and the number of victories 
that it scored. 
Ill. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Industries contest political issues that may be either important or unimportant to 
them, and they may either win, lose, or compromise in the contests. We have no 
comprehensive dollar valuation of the benefits sought and attained, but our data do 
allow various options for aggregating the political contests entered and weighting 
the successes obtained. We were driven to employ no less than seven dependent 
variables.2 The first three were drawn from data generated by the Congressional 
computer system, which will produce a list of all bills that include words indicating 
the products of the industry. After checking for mis~lassifications,~ we used the re- 




Number of pieces of legislation filed during 1976-80 deemed to 
affect the industry. 
Weighted sum of number of bills filed during 1976-80 deemed to 
affect the industry. Bills favoring the industry were given 4 points if 
passed by both Houses of Congress, 3 if taken to a floor vote, 2 if a 
committee vote occurred, 1 if only introduced. Bills opposed by the 
industry were weighted 3 if never reported out of committee, 2 if 
voted on by committee but stopped short of a floor vote, and 1 if 
defeated in a floor vote (no points if the anti-industry bill passed). 
Weighted sum of number of bills filed during 1976-80 deemed to 
affect the industry. Bills favorably affecting the industry were given 
a weight of 1 if they were passed by both Houses of Congress, -1 if 
they were adopted over the industry’s opposition. 
These three variables were designed to range between a pure measure of political 
activity (BILLS) and one of political success (ZBILL). WTBILL is an arbitrary 
combination of the two attributes that weights activity (the number of bills filed) by 
the industry’s ability to advance those it supports and halt those that it opposes. 
WTBILL is congenial to our assumption that industries face considerable uncer- 
tainty about political success and so expend political resources in some degree when- 
ever their interests are affected. 
The second group of dependent variables was drawn from the results of a survey 
of 150 Washington offices and trade associations linked to the 35 sampled industries. 
Each organization was asked to list its legislative priorities for the years 1976-80. 
Spokesmen were urged to name at least six or seven issues. It was made clear that 
blocking hostile legislation should be valued just as much as pushing a favored bill 
through Congress. Each priority on an industry’s list of issues when compared to the 
actual outcome, with the advice of both the industry lobbyists and Congressional 
2. A full description of the data base and industry sample appears in Esty (1981, chap. 9).  The data set 
and additional information can be secured from Professor Caves. 
3. Such as a bill allegedly affecting the footwear industry that actually dealt with the bootlegging of 
cigarettes1 This method fails to catch bills that affect an industry without mentioning it explicitly, and the 
classification of bills as affecting an industry often involved the exercise of judgment. 
28 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 
staff members, was evaluated as a success for the industry, a compromise outcome, 
or a defeat. The resulting information on priorities and their attainment led to the 
creation of the following four variables: 
SCORE Weighted sum of the number of priorities indicated by the industry 
with a success weighted with two points, a compromise by one, and 
a defeat by zero. 
SCORE divided by number of priorities proclaimed by the industry. 
Identical to AVE, except that the denominator is constrained to be 
equal to or greater than five. That is, an industry was penalized as 
inactive if it could not name more than five priorities that it had 
pursued during 1976-80. 
Weighted sum of the number of priorities indicated by the industry, 
with a success receiving one point, a compromise zero, and a defeat 
minus one. 
Like the dependent variables based on the count of bills filed, these four variables 
also embody varying combinations of the attributes of activity and success. SCORE, 
like WTBILL, is a positive indicator of activity but with weights indicating the 
degree of success. AVE and ZSCORE differ in form but both approximate pure 
measures of success. MINAVE modifies AVE’s measure of success by penalizing in- 





Correlation matrix of dependent variables 
WTBILL ZBILL SCORE AVE MINAVE ZSCORE 
BILLS .929 .294 -785 ,599 .664 ,787 





.174 .429 .263 .272 
,674 .777 .836 
.911 * 747 
,763 
We did not secure from the industry spokesmen any ranking by importance of the 
legislative goals that they named. Nonetheless, these four variables do differ from 
those based on the bill count in that they implicitly permit the industry’s spokesmen 
to focus on issues of real interest and omit those with unimportant or roughly neutral 
expected effects on its welfare. Table 1 provides a correlation matrix of the seven 
dependent variables. 
We also hypothesize that an industry’s expenditures on the political process may 
depend on its attributes. We measure two components. Lobbyists are required to  
report some expenditures made to influence legislation. The consensus (confirmed 
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by our interviews) is that the loosely drawn laws often require that only tiny frac- 
tions of actual outlays be reported: thus we made no use of these data. Rather, we 
acquired our measures of political inputs from two other sources that will be defined 
as separate variables: 
LOBBY 
PAC 
Although the budgets of lobbying organizations and trade associa- 
tions are not available to the public, we were able to secure informa- 
tion by direct survey on how many employees worked on legislative 
matters for each of these organizations. These were summed over the 
relevant lobbying organizations and trade associations of each indus- 
try and the total multiplied by $30,000 as a rough estimate of annual 
costs per employee. 
U.S. corporations may not contribute funds directly to political can- 
didat,es, but they may organize Political Action Committees to gather 
contributions from employees and distribute them to favored candi- 
dates. These contributions, subject to strict reporting requirements, 
were summed for each industry over the years 1976-78. 
LOBBYand PAC were also summed to yield RESOURCE, which is our best estimate 
of the total traceable outlays to influence Congressional acti0n.l It of course omits 
such forms of expenditure as newspaper and television advertisements, direct mail, 
and speeches and lobbying by top executives. 
IV. EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
Political outcomes are determined by a group of exogenous variables that 
describe an industry’s potential for exerting political influence and its ability to coa- 
lesce to wield this influence. The models giving rise to some of these variables are 
quite familiar and will accordingly receive brief treatment. 
Our analysis assumes that legislative action affecting an industry functions as a 
public good (or bad) for all member firms regardless of their efforts to secure (or 
repel) it. The resulting free-rider problem generates the prediction (Olson, 1965) 
that concentrated industries more readily surmount this barrier to political organi- 
zation. The free-rider problem receives a different interpretation, depending on 
whether political expenditures take the independent or the facilitating role de- 
scribed above. The former interpretation implies that political favors can be bought, 
and that an industry’s ability to overcome free-riding should affect its level of outlay. 
Seller concentration then should positively affect an industry’s level of expenditure. 
The relationship could arise not just because concentrated industries overcome free- 
riding, but also because their excess profits become important for buying political 
influence if funds for that use cannot be readily borrowed from the bank. On the 
other hand, concentration may wield its influence through facilitating consensus on 
issues and allowing an industry to demand with a unified voice the political benefits 
4. LOBBY was first trebled to make it comparable to PAC’s three-year total. In the regressions re- 
ported below we tested to see whether LOBBY and PAC are indeed homogeneous in their influence. 
Homogeneity could be rejected for only one of our seven measures of political activity and success. 
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to which its attributes entitle it. The “facilitation” view of political expenditure thus 
implies that concentration influences political activity and success but not expendi- 
ture.s Therefore, we use: 
Squared value of the four-firm concentration ratio of the industry, 
1972. 
C4SQ 
Squaring the concentration ratio seems responsive to the rapid proliferation of the 
free-rider problem expected as concentration drops below its highest levels; it also 
responds to Spence’s (1978) finding about the apparent effect of “unconcentration” 
on uncertainty and goal congruence within the industry. We shall use a two-tailed 
test on C4SQ because some lines of reasoning suggest that Concentration might be 
hostile to political influence. Coolidge and Tullock (1980) pointed out that concen- 
trated industries often face regulation and general public ill-will that undermines 
their political influence. Caves (1976) suggested that they may fare badly insofar as 
the political process involves a balancing of perceived equities as between the deserv- 
ing and undeserving. 
Models based on voting behavior indicate that industry size should wield a posi- 
tive influence on political success insofar as a larger industry’s activity affects more 
voters, so that their self-interested electoral preferences coincide with the interests of 
the industry. The connection between any economic measure of size and voting 
power is somewhat loose, because an industry’s votes per dollar of value added en- 
compass not only its own input structure but also the perceived interests of suppliers, 
customers, and the like. Therefore, no particular measure of size can formally be 
shown preferable, and we simply employ: 
VA Value added by the industry through manufacture, 1977. 
Given the degree of free-riding, a large industry should more readily mobilize the 
resources to overcome any scale economies in political influence. There are reasons 
to expect scale economies in lobbying, as Bartlett (1973) urged. The adversary nat- 
ure of the political process makes the role of industry size ambiguous, in that size 
renders an industry conspicuous and a target for lucrative exactions by groups well 
endowed for political success. For that reason the positive relation of VA to political 
influence may be more apparent in dependent variables that emphasize activity 
than those that emphasize political success. 
Contrary to the assumption maintained so far, not all political effort exerted on 
an industry’s behalf comes through industry-wide associations. Individual firms 
may undertake much of it directly. In that case the consideration of scale economies 
points to a positive influence for the absolute sizes of the firms (or the leading firms) 
in the industry. Large firms are more likely to have Political Action Committees 
(Epstein, 1979) and probably enjoy easier access to members of Congress. Yet, 
weighty counter-arguments can also be put forth. Small enterprises, especially if 
decentralized, may carry substantial weight in a political system with geographical 
representation. Large firms with diversified activities will find that their overall 
interests are balanced on some issues that would leave smaller and (by assumption) 
more specialized firms with clear preferences. The variable used is: 
5. An interesting empirical study of firms’ motives for joining collective associations is provided by 
Marsh (1976). 
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Number of enterprises with annual sales exceeding $250 million 
classified to each industry.6 
BIGFIRM 
We can anticipate at  this point the problem of multicollinearity that routinely 
plagues investigations of this sort. Large firms tend to operate in large industries and 
to hold large market shares, causing firm size to be highly correlated with industry 
size and seller concentration. Expressing concentration in its squared form was ex- 
pected to reduce this problem and did so in fact. However, BIGFIRM and VA turned 
out to be highly correlated. Therefore we employed the strategy of partitioning the 
industry’s value added into that originating in large and in small enterprises by de- 
fining the following variables: 
BZGVA 
LITTLEVA 
Value added in the industry by large enterprises with annual sales 
of manufactures exceeding $250 million; 
Value added in the industry by enterprises with annual sales of 
manufactures less than $250 m i l l i ~ n . ~  
If industry size and the sizes of leading firms both exert positive influences on politi- 
cal activity and success, then BIGVA and LITTLEVA should both take significant 
positive coefficients, but with their magnitudes indicating that a dollar’s worth of 
economic activity in a large enterprise yields more political clout. 
In a system of geopolitical representation, an industry’s political influence may 
increase as its economic activity becomes dispersed and its members can wield influ- 
ence in a larger number of Congressional districts. Examples abound of political 
triumphs by small-businesses industries with their enterprise units widely dispersed 
(funeral directors, dairymen). A contrary argument may also be developed, because 
geographic and geopolitical concentration of an industry assists in forming con- 
sensus and defeating the free-rider problem as well as guaranteeing a decisive say 
with some members of Congress. Thus there is no firm prediction about the sign of 
Index of geographic dispersion of economic activity, 1977. For each 
industry and state, the number of employees as a percentage of the 
state’s total employment was calculated. The industry’s mean percent- 
age of state employment (across the 50 states) was then divided by the 
standard deviation of this employment percentage. 
Although these exogenous variables lie at the core of previous theoretical and 
statistical research, the list hardly satisfies the requirement of a complete model. 
Toward that end we employed several variables that seem likely to influence an 
industry’s political activity, success, or both. A generation of lore on the military- 
industrial complex suggests that involvement with national defense yields substan- 
tial political clout for an industry. We expect a greater rate of political success for 
industries designated as 
Dummy variable set equal to one for tank building, shipbuilding, air- 
frame, and petroleum refining industries. 
CEO 
VITAL 
6. Sales figures are on the basis of the U.S. Bureau of the Census Enterprise Statistics. and so exclude 
sales outside of manufacturing. Data for 1977 were not available when the project was undertaken, and so 
1972 information was used. 
7.  Thesubdivision of the industry’s value added into these two components is approximate and subject 
to error, because of the form in which these data are presented in the Enterprise Statistics. 
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In the same spirit we find that industries have been affected in varying degrees by a 
perceived public interest and subjected, as a consequence, to regulation. Regulation 
itself can either impair or protect an industry> interest; its occurrence probably 
indicates little about an industry’s political success. It does suggest a high degree 
of involvement, and so a positive relation to political activity is expected for the 
variable: 
REG Judgmental variable ranging from 5 (most regulated) to 1 (least regu- 
lated) summarizing intensity of all types of U.S. government regulation 
affecting the industry.8 
The adversary nature of many redistributive political decisions calls for an extensive 
effort to represent the political strength of the industry in question relative to  those 
opposing it on the actual issues. The uncertain signs of market-structure variables 
such as BZGFZRM and VA discourage any elaborate effort to represent the weighted 
average political strength of an industry’s opponents. We do invoke the proposition 
that an industry selling to other producer sectors faces a core of potentially organized 
opposition to any effort to seek rents through the political process. Political success 
should thus be negatively related to: 
Number of industries to which the industry sells, indicated by positive 
values in the cells of the input-output table. 
OPP 
This variable rests on the traditional assumption that household consumers are gen- 
erally unorganized and offer little regular opposition. It is contradicted by the in- 
stances in which political entrepreneurship has succeeded in making an industry’s 
political objectives a matter of general public concern, whether to its benefit or 
detriment (Anderson, 1981). One approach to this problem would be to assume that 
a substantial threshold must be transcended before an industry comes into promi- 
nence in the general news media and with the broad public. An industry thus may be 
exposed either to favorable or unfavorable public opinion, or it niay simply be ig- 
nored. In an attempt to capture this exposure we devised two variables: 
Number of times an industry is mentioned in the New Yotk Times 
Index during the years 1977 and 1979 when the publicity is 
thought to have been generally favorable. 
Number of times an industry is mentioned in the New York Times 
Index during they years 1977 and 1979 when the publicity is 
thought to have been generally unfavorable. 
The two variables serve to test the possibility that political activity and success are 
affected asymmetrically by favorable and unfavorable exposure. 
A final aspect of the model lies in the harmony of interest among factors of pro- 
duction employed by an industry. In organizational models the firm is conceived as a 
coalition of specialized factors, each with possible access to long-term rents and 
quasi-rents flowing from the firm’s activities. Uniting these factors to exert political 
influence presents a free-rider problem like that of coalescing the industry’s compet- 
ing firms. The most conspicuous organizational feature of the industry’s hired fac- 
tors of production is surely the degree of unionization of the labor force. However, its 
PROM 
NEGPROM 
8. This variable represents a consensus judgment based on the opinions of several experts on regula- 
tion, notably Professor James Q.  Wilson. 
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influence on our measure of political activity and success is ambiguous, because 
organized labor could amplify an industry’s influence on some issues while opposing 
its entrepreneurs on those issues dividing labor and management. Indeed, one- 
quarter of the industries in our sample listed “defeat of labor law reform” among 
their legislative priorities. Therefore, in some auxiliary regressions we included 
Percentage of production workers in an industry who are members of 
a trade union. 
UNION 
We tested for the effect of labor-management political conflicts by employing 
UANTI Number of legislative priorities on which management and union are 
opposed, multiplied by UNION. 
V. ESTIMATION AND STATISTICAL RESULTS 
These variables were collected for a sample of manufacturing industries. An im- 
portant objective in selecting industries was to assure substantial variance among 
them in the sizes of their leading firms, as well as to include some industries that 
contain very large firms. Therefore, we secured a list of the largest and the smallest 
150 enterprises included in the 1980 Forturic Doirhle 500 Directory. We then picked 
for consideration industries with which some of these firms could clearly be identi- 
fied. We narrowed the resulting list of industries further by excluding those lacking 
clear boundaries or fitting badly into the Standard Industrial Classification. We also 
omitted some industries closely similar to others on our list and sought roughly repre- 
sentative coverage across the manufacturingsection of the Standard Industrial Clas- 
sification. The resulting sample used in the following analysis consists of thirty-five 
industries. 
Our principal analytical problem, indicated in section 11, was to determine 
whether an industry’s outlays on political activity wield an independent influence or 
merely assist it to gather the political benefits due to its attributes. In table 2 we 
present a regression analysis of the variables introduced above in order to address 
this question. Table 2 contains eight regression equations, the dependent variables 
being the seven measures of political activity and success and R E S O U R C E ,  the com- 
bined measure of expenditures. The right-hand column of the table, which contains 
an OLS regression equation with R E S O U R C E  as the dependent variable, provides a 
convenient starting point. First of all, the high proportion of RESOURCE’S variance 
explained lends appreciable support to the “facilitation” view of political expendi- 
ture. So does the fact that variables accounting for much of the explanatory power 
are industry size and VITAL, the dummy indicating defense and military involve- 
ment. Large sectors and those heavily involved with public expenditure presumably 
have more numerous points of contact with public decision-making, demanding 
higher transactional outlays. The coefficients of BIGVA and LITTLEVAg on their 
faces suggest that small enterprises spend more on political activity per dollar of 
value added than do large ones. Before accepting that conclusion, however, we 
should note that RESOURCE may omit some types of political outlay. If there are 
scale economies in political representation, large firms are likely to undertake politi- 
9. The variables BlCFlRM and VA. defined above, proved highly collinear as expected (0.87). and so 
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cal activities on their own, small firms through industry associations, so the propor- 
tion of large firms’ total outlays omitted from RESOURCE is probably greater than 
for small firms.1° The variables that fail to contribute to explaining RESOURCE - 
C4SQ and CEO - are as interesting as the ones that do. However seller concentra- 
tion may affect political influence, it does not serve to overcome the free-rider prob- 
lem and thereby enlarge the industry’s spending on Congressional representation. 
Similarly, geopolitical dispersion is an attribute that has no positive influence on the 
political outlays that we measure. 
Now we can turn to the remaining equations of table 2, in which the seven mea- 
sures of political activity and success are regressed on the attribute variables and also 
on RESOURCE. Tobit methods of estimation are employed for five of the seven 
variables which are constrained to be nonnegative (two are bounded from above as 
well); R2 values from the corresponding OLS equations are reported for comparison, 
but these are biased and therefore can be taken only as general indicators. 
In examining the regressions, we seek to determine both those exogenous varia- 
bles which affect all dependent variables significantly and those which differentially 
affect the dependent variables measuring activity and success. RESOURCE wields a 
significant positive influence on most dependent variables, but it affects political 
activity more strongly than political success. The significance of this result is consid- 
ered below. Seller concentration (C4SQ) proves significant at the 5 percent confi- 
dence level in all but one equation (10 percent in that one) and seems an equally good 
predictor of political activity and success. Since C4SQ’s influence does not operate 
through RESOURCE, we conclude that seller concentration amplifies political in- 
fluence not through overcoming the free-rider problem to mobilize funds- but 
through fostering agreement within an industry on the positions to be taken and 
political benefits to be pursued. On the other hand, with RESOURCE controlled, 
the variables describing industry and company size have rather muted impacts. 
BZGVA is generally quite insignificant, although the strongest indications of a posi- 
tive influence do come for the measures emphasizing political success (ZBZLL and 
ZSCORE). LITTLEVA shows a somewhat more regular positive influence, but one 
that is only weakly significant. 
An industry’s geopolitical dispersion (CEO) is positively related to six of the seven 
dependent variables; its significance is erratic but tends to favor political success 
more than political activity. The status of a vital industry (VITAL) has a quite erratic 
influence - sometimes significantly positive, sometimes significantly negative. 
Such industries did well on an objective scoring (ZBILL) but tended to do poorly on 
their subjective scoring of their own political success (SCORE, MINAVE, ZS-  
CORE). Regulated status (REG) appears to predict a high level of political activity 
for an industry but not a high level of success. l2  The adversary interest of customer 
10. Nonetheless, Mann and McCormick (1980) do report results agreeing with our regression coeffi- 
cients to the effect that large firms spend proportionally less on lobbying than do small firms. 
11. We constructed alternative versions of these variables based on industry sales rather than value 
added because of the approximation involved in calculating BIGVA and LITTLEVA. Value added is 
theoretically the more appropriate variable, but we were concerned with whether the differing approxi- 
mations involved in constructing the two sets of variables would influence the results. Substitution of the 
sales-based variables leaves us with the same assessment of the influence of the industry’s smaller firms. 
However, it suggests somewhat more strongly a negative influence of the activity carried on by large firms. 
12. REGS failure to wield a positive influence on RESOURCE is somewhat surprising. Probably much 
of a regulated industryk expenditure on influence and representation is addressed to the regulatory agency 
and the executive branch rather than the legislature, and is thus omitted from RESOURCE. 
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industries (indicated by OPP) exerts a negative influence on the dependent varia- 
bles, but one not generally significant statistically. l 3  The proportion of variance 
explained by these equations is quite high, with activity (BILLS, SCORE) explained 
somewhat better than success. 
Several other explanatory factors proposed above were omitted from the equa- 
tionsof table 2, because they proved both weak in theoretical specification (or statis- 
tical embodiment) and insignificant empirically. The two variables indicating the 
role of unions supporting or opposing the industry’s political positions were insignifi- 
cant, with UNION generally taking an incorrect (negative) sign and U A N T l  a cor- 
rect (negative) one. Adding these variables to the equation of table 2 increases 
slightly the significance of some coefficients of other variables but leaves our general 
interpretation unchanged. An industry’s public prominence was expected to affect 
its political success in a direction depending on the balance of favorable and unfa- 
vorable publicity. PROM, depicting favorable publicity, is always insignificant. 
NEGPROM, unfavorable publicity, should increase an industry’s political activity 
but decrease its success. NEGPROM is indeed sometimes significantly positive (WT- 
BILL) and sometimes significantly negative (ZSCORE),  but the pattern is neither 
robust nor systematic across the dependent variables. l 4  NECPROM‘s significance 
depends entirely on the inclusion of the petroleum industry in the sample. 
Are there scale economies in political influence? With the variable RESOURCE 
aggregated over a variety of actors in each industry, our data base is not ideal to 
answer this question. Nonetheless, insofar as an industry’s coalition pursues a unified 
set of interests, it is reasonable to check for any evidence of increasing returns over 
the outlay ranges represented by these sectors by adding the squared value of RE- 
SOURCE to the equation. The coefficient of the squared term should be positive if 
increasing returns are present; it is usually negative and always insignificant. There 
is no evidence of increasing returns to industries making larger political 
expenditures. 
We return finally to the role to be attributed to political expenditures. Statisti- 
cally, it does not fall exclusively into either the independent or the facilitating model 
developed above, RESOURCE’S variation can be explained quite well by industries’ 
attributes, as the facilitation model predicts. The greater statistical influence that 
RESOURCE exerts on political activity relative to success seems to support a 
transactions-cost interpretation. Nevertheless, RESOURCE does influence political 
outcomes after industries’ attributes are controlled. Some attributes, notably C4SQ 
and G E O ,  exert their influence without any intermediation from RESOURCE; 
they affect political outcomes but are not among the significant determinants of 
RESOURCE. Therefore an independent role cannot be entirely ruled out. 
13. The variable OPP only scratches the surface of interindustry relations in relation to political bene- 
fits. Not every measure favoring an industry is autoniatically adverse to the interests of its customers or 
suppliers. Even if these relations were uniform, what (interindustry and intraindustry) distribution of 
customers has the greatest effect on the industryB pursuit of benefits is subject to conflicting hypotheses. In 
our judgment these relationships are not efficiently pursued in the framework of a broad cross-section 
investigation. 
14. Our skepticism about PROM and NEGPROM is increased by their potential endogeneity in the 
model: publicity results in part from an industry’s political activity. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Previous studies of the contribution of an industry’s market structure to its politi- 
cal influence have suffered from serious deficiencies such as incomplete measure- 
ment of influence, inconsistencies of the timing or locus of political influence and 
results, and neglect of the relationship between inputs and outputs of the political 
process. This paper employs new data on the political activity and success of thirty- 
five manufacturing industries in the U.S.  Congress during 1976-80, along with an 
estimate of each industry’s expenditure on legislative representation and influence. 
We expected each industry’s political activity and success to depend on the structural 
attributes that determine its intrinsic political power and the resources spent to in- 
fluence Congressional decisions. An important question concerns the relationship 
between attributes and expenditures. Expenditures to gain political favors could 
either be independent of the structural attributes, or they could merely constitute 
transaction costs needed to convert the latent political power conferred by the at- 
tributes into actual results. If expenditures are an independent factor, they should 
contribute to explaining political success after attributes are controlled, and attrib- 
utes should not explain expenditures. If expenditures merely facilitate, they should 
not explain political success after attributes are controlled, and expenditures them- 
selves should depend largely on attributes. 
Our results lean toward the ”facilitation” view of expenditure, in that expendi- 
ture is well explained by attributes, and expenditure levels themselves are associated 
with political activity more than with success. However, the independent role of 
expenditures is supported by a prevalent statistically significant influence of expend- 
itures on political outcomes after attributes are controlled. Among the attributes, 
seller concentration increases both activity and success but does not affect expendi- 
ture. Hence its influence must arise not from solving the free-rider problem of mobi- 
lizing political contributions but from assisting an industry to express its preferences 
with a unified voice.lS We investigated the (collinear) influences of the sizes of in- 
dustries and the sizes of their leading companies by splitting each industry’s value 
added into that emanating from firms above a threshold size and that due to smaller 
firms. Neither firm size nor industry size has a robust influence on political activity 
or success with expenditures held constant. Geographic dispersion of an industry’s 
activity tends to increase its political activity and success, although not its expendi- 
tures. An industry’s perceived vital status (defense inputs, for example) seems to 
improve its batting average but overall has an unclear effect. Regulated status, on 
the other hand, increases political activity but not success. An industry selling to 
many others faces opposition to its rent-seeking activities that tends to decrease its 
activity and success (the signs in our regressions are correct but the coefficients not 
quite significant). The unionization of an industry’s employees and its prominence in 
the current news (adverse or favorable publicity) wield no significant influence on 
its political activity or success. 
I 15. Many though not all previous studies have claimed to find a positive influence of seller concentra- 
16. Salamon and Siegfried (1977) reported a positive influence of firm size, but that result has been 
tion on variables describing pnlitical benefits to the industry 
contested (Coolidge and Tullock, 1980). 
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